من تسريبات "WikiLeaks"..... WikiLeaks: Egyptian military an institution in decline 'Le Monde' notes that army is still strong enough to guarantee stability of the regime; says generals are jealous of US military aid to Israel Relations between the Eg

من تسريبات "WikiLeaks".....

'Le Monde' notes that army is still strong enough to guarantee stability of the regime; says generals are jealous of US military aid to Israel

Relations between the Egyptian military and the United states have
deteriorated in recent years, according to US diplomatic cables obtained
by Le Monde and published Tuesday.

A 2008 cable emanating from the US Embassy in Cairo said, "The Egyptian
army is an institution in decline," but remains strong enough to
"guarantee the stability of the regime," according to the report. It
noted that the army operates "a vast network of commercial enterprises "
and real estate in the Nile Delta and Red Sea areas.

Another cable, written earlier this year, acknowledged that the US and
Israel certainly "welcomed the effectiveness" of Egyptian efforts to
maintain the blockade on Gaza and in combating "the flow of weapons and
illicit funds" for Hamas in the Strip," Le Monde reported.

Also noted in the series of cables revealed by Le
Monde was the apparent jealously that Egyptian generals hold towards the
amount of military aid that Israel receives from the US, relative to
what Cairo receives. The report quotes an Egyptian general
complaining to the US assistant secretary of defense that the ratio of
aid has gone from 2:3 ($2 billion for Egypt, $3 billion for Israel) to
2:5 in recent years, a disparity which the Egyptian called "a violation of Camp David."



A series of recent conversations with academics and
other civilian analysts reveals their sense that while
Egypt's military is in decline, it nevertheless remains a
powerful institution. (Note: These academics' expertise in
Egyptian politics and willingness to comment on the sensitive
issue of the military's current role makes them valuable
interlocutors for us. End note.) An American University in
Cairo (AUC) political science professor with family ties to
the officer corps told us that the military reached its peak
of influence in the late 1980's before the ouster of the
recently deceased former Defense Minister Abu Ghazalah, who
was dismissed because of his growing political popularity.
He asserted that since 1989, the MOD's influence in Egyptian
society has been gradually waning, and the privileged social
position of its elite members has been in decline as
society's respect for the military fades. One
political-military analyst at the GOE-funded Al-Ahram Center
who is a retired general noted that military salaries have
fallen far below what is available in the private sector, and
that a military career is no longer an attractive option for
ambitious young people who aspire to join the new business
elite instead.

A senior Cairo University political science professor
opined that before the 1967 war, military officers were
"spoiled," and constituted a social elite. Following the
military's poor performance in the 1967 war, he said,
officers began a descent out of the upper ranks of society
that accelerated after Abu Ghazalah's ouster in 1989. Since
Abu Ghazalah, a senior AUC political science professor noted,
the regime has not allowed any charismatic figures to reach
the senior ranks. "(Defense Minister) Tantawi looks like a
bureaucrat," he joked.

The AUC professor described the
mid-level officer corps as generally disgruntled, and said
that one can hear mid-level officers at MOD clubs around
Cairo openly expressing disdain for Tantawi. These officers
refer to Tantawi as "Mubarak's poodle," he said, and complain
that "this incompetent Defense Minister" who reached his
position only because of unwavering loyalty to Mubarak is
"running the military into the ground." He opined that a
culture of blind obedience pervades the MOD where the sole
criteria for promotion is loyalty, and that the MOD
leadership does not hesitate to fire officers it perceives as
being "too competent" and who therefore potentially pose a
threat to the regime.

Seventy-seven year old Field Marshall Tantawi, in
office since 1991, has resisted any change to usage of FMF
funding and has been the chief impediment to transforming the
military,s mission to meet emerging security threats.
During his tenure, the tactical and operational readiness of
the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) has decayed.

A political-military analyst with an academic
background at the GOE-funded Al-Ahram Center believes that
the government's increasing opposition to dialogue with
academia is symptomatic of its social and intellectual
decline. He said that up until 6 years ago, the MOD had

assigned a military representative to the Al-Ahram Center to
participate in academic discussions; subsequently, the MOD
jailed the representative because his views were becoming too
independent, and has not sent a replacement to the center.
He claimed that Tantawi has become increasingly intolerant of
intellectual freedom and in 2006 refused to allow the
Al-Ahram Center to pursue a research project with the Royal
Dutch Military Society on military reform in Egypt and
Holland. In his view, Tantawi has made clear that the
military is "off-limits" as a subject for academic research,
and that the MOD will not tolerate independent thought within
its own ranks.

Although analysts see a small number of regime and
business elites exercising increasing political and economic
control over the country, they acknowledge the military's
strong influence in Egypt's economy. A senior AUC
political-science professor opined that the regime gives the
six businessmen in the cabinet carte blanche to pursue
commercial activities, but that the defense minister can put
a hold on any contract for "security concerns." Contacts
told us that military-owned companies, often run by retired
generals, are particularly active in the water, olive oil,
cement, construction, hotel and gasoline industries. The
senior Cairo University professor pointed out that military
companies built the modern road to the Ain Souknah Red Sea
resorts 90 minutes from Cairo and Cairo University's new
annex. He noted the large amounts of land owned by the
military in the Nile Delta and on the Red Sea coast,
speculating that such property is a "fringe benefit" in
exchange for the military ensuring regime stability and
security. (Comment: We see the military's role in the
economy as a force that generally stifles free market reform
by increasing direct government involvement in the markets.
End comment.)

Most analysts agreed that the military views the GOE's
privatization efforts as a threat to its economic position,
and therefore generally opposes economic reforms. The senior
Cairo University professor speculated that privatization has
forced military-owned companies to improve the quality of
their work, specifically in the hotel industry, to compete
with private firms and attract critical foreign investment.
One of the Al-Ahram Center political-military analysts
predicted that the growing power of the economic elite at the
military's expense is inevitable as economic necessity drives
the government to maintain its economic reform policies in
order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). He said
that FDI is essential to the government's plans to maintain
economic growth and political stability.

Contacts agree that presidential son Gamal Mubarak's
power base is centered in the business community, not with
the military. The senior Cairo University political science
professor said officers told him recently that the military





does not support Gamal and if Mubarak died in office, the
military would seize power rather than allow Gamal to succeed
his father. However, analysts agreed that the military would
allow Gamal to take power through an election if President
Mubarak blessed the process and effectively gave Gamal the
reigns of power. The AUC junior political science professor
opined that after Gamal became active in the NDP in 2002, the
regime empowered the reformers in the 2004 cabinet to begin
privatization efforts that buttressed the wealthy businessmen
close to Gamal. In his estimation, the regime's goal is to
create a business-centered power base for Gamal in the NDP to
compensate for his lack of military credentials. A necessary
corollary to this strategy, he claimed, was for the regime to
weaken the military's economic and political power so that it
cannot block Gamal's path to the presidency.


The military still remains a potent
political and economic force. Its recent interventions,
using the MOD's considerable resources, to produce bread to
meet shortages in March and extinguish the Shoura Council
fire in August (refs A and B) demonstrate that it sometimes
can successfully step in where other government agencies
fail. The military helps to ensure regime stability and
operates a large network of businesses as it becomes a
"quasi-commercial" enterprise itself. While there are
economic and political tensions between the business elite
and the military, the overall relationship between the two
still appears to be cooperative, rather than adversarial.
The military's loss of some prestige is partly due to the
disappearance of an imminent, external military threat
following the 1979 Camp David Accords. The regime, aware of
the critical role the MOD can play in presidential
succession, may well be trying to co-opt the military through
patronage into accepting Gamal's path to the presidency. We
agree with the analysis that senior military officers would
support Gamal if Mubarak resigned and installed him in the
presidency, as it is difficult to imagine opposition from
these officers who depend on the president and defense
minister for their jobs and material perks. In a messier
succession scenario, however, it becomes more difficult to
predict the military's actions. While mid-level officers do
not necessarily share their superiors' fealty to the regime,
the military's built-in firewalls and communication breaks
make it unlikely that these officers could independently
install a new leader.

Recently, academics and civilian analysts
painted a portrait of an Egyptian military in intellectual
and social decline, whose officers have largely fallen out of
society's elite ranks. They describe a disgruntled mid-level
officer corps harshly critical of a defense minister they
perceive as incompetent and valuing loyalty above skill in
his subordinates. However, analysts perceive the military as
retaining strong influence through its role in ensuring
regime stability and operating a large network of commercial
enterprises. Regarding succession, analysts highlight the
armed forces' uneasiness with Gamal Mubarak, but largely
agree that the military would support Gamal if President
Mubarak resigns and installs him in the presidency, a
scenario we view as unlikely. One professor opined that
since 2003, the regime has tried to strengthen the economic
elite close to Gamal at the expense of the military in an
effort to weaken potential military opposition to Gamal's
path to the presidency. Other analysts believe the regime is
trying to co-opt the military through patronage into
accepting Gamal and that despite tensions between the
military and business, their relationship remains
cooperative.

المصدر لا يذكر اي سلاح في الجيش علي وجه التحديد...لم يذكر أي شيئ عن
القوات الجويه أو غيرها.....هذا لا يعني أي شيئ....فهو يتحدث عن decline في
الجيش عامة...